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Abstract: Rosenbloom et al. (2020) downplay the role of carbon pricing in climate policy. We counter 
their criticisms. 
 
Rosenbloom et al. (2020)1 claim that framing climate change as a market failure fails to appreciate it is 
a “system problem”. This overlooks that market failures, such as negative/positive externalities and 
public goods/bads, represent a clear systemic perspective on problems and policies.2 Carbon pricing 
(CP) is moreover a prime example of systemic policy: it shifts simultaneously choices of consumers, 
producers, investors and innovators in all sectors – essential to a low-carbon transformation.3 We agree 
that additional instruments supporting innovation and escape from carbon lock-in are needed. Historical 
absence of CP contributed, though, to current lock-in. 
The authors suggest that CP means efficiency is an overriding policy priority. But efficiency requires 
effectiveness. CP is highly effective as no decision in the economy escapes its influence, resulting in 
closure of all behavioral and economic holes through which emissions leak. It therefore better limits 
energy/carbon rebound than other instruments.4 For example, CP discourages spending savings of 
energy conservation on high-carbon goods, as these will be more expensive. This said, it seems 
Rosenbloom et al. do not value efficiency much. Inefficient policies contribute, however, to less 
emissions reduction for a given cost, lower incomes and unemployment – which will hamper stable 
political support. 
The authors neglect that CP is critical to innovation. But CP contributes to steering innovations towards 
low-carbon products and production, because private investors are influenced by price expectations as 
these co-determine profit opportunities.5 Furthermore, unlike other instruments, CP stimulates among 
‘clean’ technologies the cleaner ones, like solar PV panels with low-carbon lifecycles.6 
The authors prefer a context-sensitive over a universal approach. But sector-specific approaches tend to 
be ad hoc, costly and susceptible to lobbying, while causing inter-sectoral carbon leakage. Moreover, 
climate policy is bound to remain weak if fragmented between jurisdictions. Policy harmonization is 
needed to weaken freeriding and international-competitiveness concerns that hamper stringent policies. 
A CO2 price facilitates comparison and harmonization of national policies.
7 
Regarding political realities, the authors suggest CP faces much resistance. However, this holds for all 
serious climate policies. No evidence is provided that other effective instruments receive more political 
support. On the contrary, CP is quite popular: almost 60 jurisdictions have implemented it in some 
form.8 
While CP has been criticized as inequitable, this is not the case if complemented by appropriate revenue 
recycling.9 In fact, no other instrument generates revenues for compensation. To compare, adoption 
subsidies for rooftop solar PV or electric vehicles even use up money, and are inequitable by going to 
well-off households. 
It is not true that CP is only supported by neoclassical economics. Many types of empirical and 
theoretical studies underpin its effectiveness, including agent-based models describing boundedly-
rational and socially-sensitive behaviors.10 
The literature on low-carbon transitions offers creative policy ideas. It is time that CP is integrated with 
these into a more complete theory of transition policy. 
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